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THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: SOME
VALEDICTORY REFLECTIONS TWENTY YEARS
AFTER APPRENDI *
FRANK O. BOWMAN, III **
This Article reflects on the author’s professional experience and intellectual
evolution in relation to federal sentencing policy and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.
The account begins with the author’s first encounters with the Guidelines when
he was a zealous Assistant U.S. Attorney, continues through his transition to
teacher, scholar, policy advocate, and occasional sentencing consultant, and
concludes with the author pessimistic about the prospects of meaningful federal
sentencing reform.
The utility, if any, of these musings will lie partly in the fact that the author has
been deeply involved with federal sentencing policy and practice for thirty years
but mostly in the fact that he has felt obliged to change his mind as events and
experience challenged his previous convictions. Some reconstruction of the
evolution of the author’s thinking as the Guidelines arose, failed, and died—but
then achieved an enduring afterlife as law that lingers even though it cannot
bind—may be of modest use when the time finally comes to build something truly
new.
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INTRODUCTION
I have been practicing or writing about federal criminal law for over forty
years. For three-quarters of that period, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) have been a dominant feature of the lives of federal
practitioners, judges, and defendants. Because the Guidelines loomed so large,
they were the primary focus of my writing for some fifteen years after I made
the transition from practicing lawyer to academic. I still think about them
occasionally, and help update a treatise on the subject annually, 1 but I confess
that, over the last decade or so, my attention has wandered. The Supreme
Court’s 2005 decision in United States v. Booker 2—a distorted emanation of the
subject of this retrospective symposium, Apprendi v. New Jersey 3—found the
Guidelines unconstitutional and caused a huge rumpus during which (for better
or worse) I had a great deal to say. 4 But within about five years, the dust settled.
To the surprise of practically everyone, the mandatory-turned-advisory system
that the courts jury-rigged from Booker’s conclusion that advisory guidelines
would be constitutionally acceptable became not an interim placeholder
pending a thorough overhaul but an accepted and (so far) enduring replacement
for the pre-Apprendi-Booker regime. 5
I think the persistence of the advisory federal sentencing Guidelines in
their current form is regrettable. Leave to one side the fact that the Booker
decision and its subsequent embellishments are a constitutional bait and switch
in which the Supreme Court disguised a judicial will to power behind a
pretended concern for the Sixth Amendment jury right. Far more important
than dissection of Booker’s doctrinal gobbledygook is the practical consideration
that it makes little sense to maintain a fact-intensive, procedurally complex,
time-and-resource-consuming sentencing framework that was designed to
tightly constrain judicial discretion after the Supreme Court has declared that
1. ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK O. BOWMAN, III & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK (2020).
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
4. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American
Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2010) [hereinafter Bowman,
Debacle]; Frank O. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee . . . or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary Observations
About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 279 (2006)
[hereinafter Bowman, Year of Jubilee]; Frank O. Bowman, III, Beyond Band-Aids: A Proposal for
Reconfiguring Federal Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149 (2005) [hereinafter Bowman,
Beyond Band-Aids]; Frank O. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of
Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235 (2005); Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315 (2005) [hereinafter
Bowman, Failure of the Guidelines].
5. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227 (2014) [hereinafter Bowman, Dead Law Walking]
(describing both the changes wrought by the Booker opinion and the overall lack of material differences
in sentencing procedures and outcomes).
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the system is only legal if it places no enforceable constraints on judicial
discretion. Worse still, even though judges are no longer legally bound by the
sentencing ranges generated by Guidelines calculations, in practice, they remain
heavily influenced by those numbers; 6 and the administrative apparatus that
created and continues to tend the Guidelines long ago failed in its mission of
calibrating sentencing outcomes to rational policy goals. Years before Booker,
the Guidelines drafting process became a one-way upward ratchet producing
recommended sentencing ranges that are too often higher than can be justified
by any of the accepted rationales for criminal punishment. 7 The persistence of
the Guidelines regime, even in advisory form, perpetuates and normalizes levels
of sentence severity that should long since have been comprehensively
reconsidered.
I recognize that a good many practitioners defend the post-Booker federal
advisory system. Defense counsel laud it as an improvement over mandatory
guidelines and sometimes as a least-bad alternative to what they fear Congress
might do in creating a wholly new sentencing structure. 8 Federal prosecutors,
who generally despised Booker when it was decided, have learned to live with a
system that, in practice, continues to offer the government many of the
advantages of the pre-Booker arrangements. 9 And they, too, I suspect, are leery
of what Congress might do if encouraged to start from scratch. With rare elderly
exceptions, the current federal bench has never known any sentencing system
except the Guidelines. Judges are used to it. It prescribes quantitative
benchmarks for the inherently squishy and indeterminate exercise of imposing
punishment. And Booker enables judges who chafe at the Guidelines’
6. Id. at 1245–50 (detailing the continued correlation between Guidelines sentencing ranges and
sentences actually imposed, as well as stability in lengths of sentences imposed across multiple crime
categories between fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2013).
7. See generally Bowman, Failure of the Guidelines, supra note 4 (explaining how the statutory
structure of federal sentencing law and the interaction of federal institutions like Congress, the Justice
Department, the judiciary, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission have produced an upward-ratchet
effect on federal sentence severity); Frank O. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd PostBooker Federal Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 356 (2012) [hereinafter Bowman, Nothing
is Not Enough] (“[The] architecture and institutional arrangements [of the pre-Booker federal sentencing
system] predisposed the Commission’s rule-making process to become a one-way upward ratchet that
raised sentences often and lowered them virtually never.”).
8. See, e.g., Robb London, Aftermath, HARV. L. BULL. (July 1, 2005), https://today.law.harvard
.edu/feature/aftermath/ [https://perma.cc/839M-2KWY] (“[Booker] could turn out to be a case of ‘Be
careful what you wish for’ . . . because if sentences now start looking lenient, Congress could decide to
jump in with even tougher mandatory minimum penalties.”).
9. See, e.g., Bobby Scott, United States v. Booker: System Failure or System Fix?, 160 U. PENN.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 195, 200, 203 (2011) (noting low rate of prosecutorial objection to nonGuidelines sentences post-Booker); An Offer You Can’t Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors Force Drug
Defendants To Plead Guilty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/
05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead [https://perma.cc/
2U35-G228] (discussing how mandatory minimum sentences, which remain despite the Booker
decision, confer significant plea-bargaining leverage on federal prosecutors).
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prescriptions to ignore them in any case where they have a mind to do so. The
Sentencing Commission has an institutional interest in maintaining the current
system and, in any event, has long been reluctant even to propose significant
changes without guarantees of bipartisan congressional support. As for
Congress itself, a significant modification of the federal sentencing system
would be a heavy lift in any period. The passage of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, 10 back in an era when Congress remained a working legislative body,
was something of a miracle. 11 Today, with a Congress so riven with partisan
rancor that it cannot perform even routine functions like passing a budget, it is
hard to imagine the national legislature taking up a task as technically complex
and politically touchy as comprehensive sentencing reform. Thus, the smart
money has to be on advisory guidelines rumbling along largely unchanged for
years to come.
As a Guidelines treatise writer and occasional sentencing consultant, the
continued survival of the current Guidelines suits my narrow self-interest. But
wearing my other hats as legal scholar, policy analyst, and concerned citizen, I
find the current stasis exasperating and frankly rather depressing. The flaws in
the advisory Guidelines regime have been well understood for years. 12 Frankly,
there is almost nothing to say on this subject that could not have been said, and
indeed was said, five or even ten years ago. Each year brings a new batch of data
from the Sentencing Commission, but none of it materially alters the picture of
the advisory system visible for the past decade. 13 Likewise, the plausible

10. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 21
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 34 U.S.C.).
11. See Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must Be Restrained, and Other Lessons
in Learning To Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 680–91
[hereinafter Bowman, Quality of Mercy] (describing the evolution of sentencing thinking that
produced the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and, in due course, the Guidelines); Stephen Breyer,
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,
8–31 (1988) (describing the key compromises that were made during the drafting process); see also
Norm Ornstein, Henry Waxman: A Relic of the Era when Congress Used To Work, ATLANTIC (Feb. 6,
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/henry-waxman-a-relic-of-the-era-whencongress-used-to-work/283630/ [https://perma.cc/83EQ-C7JW] (recounting instances in the past
when “real legislators craft[ed] real legislation” and noting that today’s Congress has become “deeply
dysfunctional”).
12. See, e.g., Bowman, Failure of the Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1328–49 (describing the Sentencing
Guidelines’ “irremediable substantive defects”).
13. The U.S. Sentencing Commission issues detailed sentencing statistics annually in a
publication now called the Annual Report and Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics. See, e.g.,
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS (2021). For discussions of the statistical changes in the system since Booker, see, as an
example, Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 5, at 1235–38; Bowman, Year of Jubilee, supra note 4,
at 309–14.
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alternatives to the current system have long been reasonably well articulated. 14
But nothing happens.
That being so, I had to ask myself what is there for me to say in this Article
that I have not said before, and on some points said many times? After chewing
on the matter awhile, I concluded that perhaps the most useful thing I could
offer was a kind of valedictory reflection on my own intellectual journey with
the Guidelines, which began when I was a zealous Assistant U.S. Attorney;
continued through my transition to teacher, scholar, policy advocate, and
occasional sentencing consultant; and seems likely to end with me in the role of
disillusioned curmudgeon muttering about might-have-beens as I shuffle
towards my dotage. The utility, if any, of these musings will lie partly in the
fact that I have been up to my neck in Guidelines minutia for thirty years, but
mostly in the fact that I have felt obliged to change my mind as events and
experience challenged my previous convictions. Some reconstruction of the
evolution of my thinking as the Guidelines arose, failed, and died, but then
achieved an enduring afterlife as law that is not really law at all, may be of
modest use when the time finally comes to build something truly new.
I. THE ADVENT OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
When I started my legal career back in 1979 with the Criminal Division of
the Justice Department, sentencing was almost entirely within the discretion of
the district judge. 15 Prosecutors concerned themselves primarily with obtaining
convictions and spent relatively little time, resources, or emotional energy on
trying to secure particular sentences. That was the judge’s business. The same
was true during my later stint as a state prosecutor with the Denver District
Attorney’s Office. By the time of my second pass through the Justice
Department as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Miami, Florida, beginning in
1989, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines drafted by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission as required by the Sentencing Reform Act had been in effect for
only two years. 16 But those Guidelines (in combination with the mandatory
14. See, e.g., Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 4, at 198–215 (describing a, frankly unwieldy,
successor to the Booker advisory guidelines); Bowman, Nothing Is Not Enough, supra note 7, at 362–64
(describing constitutionally permissible alternatives to the Booker advisory guidelines, including one
originally proposed by the Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative and later endorsed by Judge
William Sessions, former Chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission); Frank O. Bowman, III, ‘Tis a
Gift To Be Simple: A Model Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 301, 301–
07 (2006) (describing the work and conclusions of the Constitution Project’s Sentencing Initiative and
summarizing a detailed proposal for a simplified version of the Guidelines authored by an ad hoc
working group consisting of Beverly Dyer, Michael O’Hear, Steven Chanenson, Mary Price, Nora
Demleitner, and Frank Bowman).
15. See Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 682–83.
16. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 2019
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C.,
and 34 U.S.C.). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States Sentencing
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minimum sentences in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 17) had already radically
altered federal criminal practice.
The Sentencing Reform Act wrought two major conceptual changes and a
host of lesser ones. First, the Guidelines brought law to the sentencing phase of
federal criminal cases. One fundamental attribute of “law” is a set of rules or
standards that correlate some legal outcome or range of outcomes to proof of
some pre-identified fact or set of facts. The rules or standards need not decree
an automatic congruence between facts and outcomes to count as law. The
correlation can be mandatory, as in: “Once Fact A is proven, Consequence B
must be imposed.” It can be permissive, as in: “Consequence B cannot be
imposed unless Fact A is proven.” It can also be presumptive, as in: “If Fact A
is proven, a presumption arises that Consequence B should follow.” 18
Nonetheless, law, at least as ordinarily understood, requires established
correlations—mandatory, permissive, or presumptive—between facts and
outcomes. It also requires a mechanism, in our system customarily a process of
appellate review, for enforcing the correlative rules.
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines, federal sentencing
was, practically speaking, lawless. 19 Judges could sentence a convicted defendant
to any term of years, fine, forfeiture, or other penalty above the minimum and
below the maximum specified by statute for the offense or offenses of
conviction. 20 To be sure, those maximums and minimums imposed hard legal
limits on the defendant’s sentence. But within the very broad range between
minimum and maximum, the judge had virtually absolute, and almost
unreviewable, discretion to impose any sentence that comported with his or her
sense of justice. 21 Moreover, judges were not even obliged to explain why they

Commission and charged it with drafting sentencing guidelines. Id. § 991; see HAINES ET AL., supra
note 1, at 1–2. The Commission did so, and Congress ratified the result effective on November 1, 1987.
17. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 801 et. seq); Bowman,
Failure of the Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1329–32.
18. All true presumptions can be overcome by other facts or considerations. We sometimes speak
of an “irrebuttable presumption.” However, a presumption that cannot be rebutted is not really a
presumption at all, but a rule: “If Fact A is proven, Consequence B must follow. No exceptions
allowed.”
19. This point was made first, or at least most famously, by Judge Marvin Frankel in his 1973
book. See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973)
(describing the inconsistency of federal sentencing at the time).
20. See, e.g., Bowman, Debacle, supra note 4, at 370–71.
21. See, e.g., Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 4, at 152–53. Even pre-Guidelines, judges
could not impose a sentence based on unconstitutional or otherwise illegal considerations, such as race
or religious affiliation. Id. But absent proof of grossly improper motive, the judge’s sentencing
discretion was almost unreviewable. See id.; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996)
(“Before the Guidelines system, a federal criminal sentence within statutory limits was, for all practical
purposes, not reviewable on appeal.” (first citing Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974);
and then citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (same))).
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imposed the sentences they did. 22 Certainly, there existed no set of rules,
standards, or guidelines identifying facts that should matter in deciding on a
sentence and establishing some required or even recommended correlation
between proof of those facts and the sentence a judge must or should impose. 23
Judges were variously envisioned as quasi-medical prescribers of the
proper type and dose of rehabilitative treatment 24 or as performing acts of
“moral reasoning.” 25 On neither theory was it thought proper to constrain
judges with standardized rules or even to insist on norms of due process such as
prior notice of the facts that would be of legal consequence at sentencing and
their probable effects if proven, a requirement of reasoned explanation of the
outcome, or access to meaningful review on appeal. 26
The Guidelines changed all that. 27 Into the interval between statutory
minimum and maximum sentences where, for long years, no law had limited
judicial discretion, the Guidelines inserted an extraordinarily detailed and
highly prescriptive structure tying proof of designated facts to precisely
calibrated increases or decreases in sentence severity. 28 In essence, the
Guidelines are a long set of instructions for a table of sentencing ranges. 29 The
vertical axis contains a series of numbers representing an aggregate score of
weighed factors measuring offense seriousness. 30 The horizontal axis has a
smaller set of numerical categories measuring the defendant’s prior criminal
22. Bowman, Beyond Band-Aids, supra note 4, at 153.
23. Bowman, Failure of the Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1322.
24. Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 684–85.
25. See KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 78–79 (1998). I have been jousting collegially with Professor Stith and Judge
Cabranes about this concept of the judicial role in sentencing for a long time. See Frank O. Bowman,
III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 319–26 (2000) [hereinafter Bowman, Fear of Law]. I have probably moved
somewhat in their direction over the years, but as the later passages in this Article show, I remain a fan
of at least presumptive legal guidance for judges at sentencing.
26. To be fair, in their influential critique of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Professor Stith
and Judge Cabranes argue that the Guidelines’ regime should be replaced by one with broad judicial
discretion, explanations of results, and some form of appellate review. STITH & CABRANES, supra note
25, at 170–72. But that was not the system before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and the forced
disassociation between facts and sentencing outcomes instituted by the Apprendi-Blakely-Booker regime
now makes any such system with even presumptive a priori sentencing rules or standards and
meaningful appellate review constitutionally suspect.
27. For an excellent account of the formulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see
generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993) (chronicling the passage of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, including its embrace by criminal justice reformers, legislative efforts,
and the limited role of the judiciary in its development). For a summary of the basic structure and
operations of the Guidelines, see generally HAINES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–12 (detailing the
principles, mission, and authority behind the Guidelines).
28. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
29. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
30. Id.
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history. 31 The sentencing judge finds facts necessary to apply the rules for
calculating offense seriousness and criminal history and assigns values on both
axes. 32 Once that task is complete, a sentencing range is generated. 33 Of course,
judges can sentence outside of the Guidelines-calculated sentencing range, 34 but
in the Guidelines’ original iteration, they could do so only through a “departure”
process carefully delimited by the Guidelines and enforced by the courts of
appeals. 35
Key to understanding everything that followed the advent of the
Guidelines is recognition that Congress imposed the law of the Guidelines on
an area of criminal practice that had for a very long time been the virtually
exclusive province of the judiciary. 36 Of course, the guideline rules themselves
were drafted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, theoretically an independent
agency in the judicial branch, but the Commission’s foundational choices were
constrained both by the statutory framework of the Sentencing Reform Act and
the necessity of securing congressional approval for their handiwork. 37 After the
Guidelines were first approved in 1987, the hundreds of amendments approved
by the Commission over the ensuing three decades also had to survive
congressional scrutiny, and many were crafted by the Commission in direct
response to congressional directives or strong suggestions. 38
31. Id.
32. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2.
35. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 3553(b), 98 Stat. 1983, 1990 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)) (“The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the Guidelines and that should result in a sentence different from that described.”); see
also Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial Revolt on “Substantial
Assistance” Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 12–13 (1999)
[hereinafter Bowman, Departing] (describing judicial departure authority prior to Booker); Frank O.
Bowman, III, Places in the Heartland: Departure Jurisprudence After Koon, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 19, 19
(1996) [hereinafter Bowman, Heartland] (explaining that the Koon majority attempted “to justify a
reallocation of authority over departure decisions away from both the Sentencing Commission and the
courts of appeals,” but that this shift “rest[ed] on a series of claims that [we]re either legally or factually
unsupportable”).
36. See Bowman, Fear of Law, supra note 25, at 310–16 (discussing historical fluctuations in the
degree of judicial control of sentencing in American history and noting that the period where judicial
control was greatest was between the late 1800s and the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act in
1984).
37. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1–2.
38. This pattern is observable across offense types. For a list of congressional directives to the
Sentencing Commission, see U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING:
AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM app. B (2004). But congressional intervention has proven especially
obvious and problematic in the area of economic crime sentencing. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour
Encourager les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the
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In short, with the Guidelines, Congress—quite consciously—wrested from
judges control over a function they had long seen as quintessentially their own.
Judges were so committed to this vision that, during the year or so following
the Guidelines enactment, many found the whole structure unconstitutional. 39
When the Supreme Court disagreed in Mistretta v. United States, 40 the lower
courts grudgingly settled into the new regime. 41 But the original resistance to
any meaningful constraint on judicial sentencing discretion remained an
undercurrent of discontent 42 and was greatly exacerbated by the extreme detail
and prescriptiveness of the Guidelines’ structure. 43 Moreover, the Commission
itself, partly in defensive response to the judges’ initial hostility to its work,
developed a sense of mission in which judges were often seen as a recalcitrant
opposition, rather than as partners in development of an experimental system. 44
The second major conceptual change effected by the Sentencing Reform
Act was the virtual elimination of all discretion from the “back end” of
sentencing—the decision about when an incarcerated person will be released
back into the community. 45 Before the Act, authority over the actual amount of
time a defendant would serve was split between the judge, who announced a
sentence expressed as a term or range of months or years, and the parole
authorities, who later decided, subject to some statutory restrictions and
administrative regulations, what fraction of the judicially determined term the
defendant would really serve. 46 The Act abolished the U.S. Parole Commission
and decreed that henceforth federal defendants would serve roughly eighty-five
percent of their imposed sentences, with only tiny adjustments for good or bad

Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That Followed, 1 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L.
373, 376–77 (2004) [hereinafter Bowman, Pour Encourager].
39. Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judge-makes-the-case-forjudgment/463380/ [https://perma.cc/M95D-7QL3] (noting that some 200 federal judges wrote
opinions finding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional).
40. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
41. See Van Meter, supra note 39 (“After a brief judicial revolt in the late 1980s, most judges
quietly fell into compliance with the guidelines.”).
42. See id. (“[Mistretta] was terribly frustrating . . . . I started screaming at the top of my lungs. I
have been screaming ever since . . . .”).
43. See id. (describing that, although one judge “sentenced mostly within the prescribed range,
. . . he railed against the guidelines in his opinions and tried to bend the rules when he thought he could
get away with it”).
44. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1750 (1992) (urging the Sentencing Commission to reverse
its policy of opposing the judiciary and, instead, arguing that it “should cooperatively develop
sentencing guidance with the judiciary, rather than unilaterally prescribe guidelines for the judiciary”).
45. See HAINES ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.
46. Bowman, Fear of Law, supra note 25, at 302 (describing the pre-Sentencing Reform Act federal
parole system); Stith & Koh, supra note 27, at 228–29 (discussing the genesis and operation of the
federal parole guidelines).
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behavior while in prison. 47 Structurally, the federal system transformed from an
indeterminate to a determinate sentencing regime. 48 At the risk of
oversimplifying the reasons for this choice, it rested largely on the twin
conclusions that: (1) the quantum of punishment should primarily be
determined by considerations of desert, deterrence, and incapacitation; and (2)
rehabilitation was passé, a personal transformation judges could not predict,
correctional authorities promote, or parole boards recognize. 49
I have always believed that the decision to introduce law to front-end
judicial sentencing choices was correct. The pre-Guidelines federal system of
unlimited and unreviewable judicial sentencing discretion was rationally
insupportable. The basic difficulty stems from the fact that, while there is a
generally recognized set of traditional sentencing purposes (retribution or just
deserts, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), 50 there is no general
agreement about how, or even whether, those purposes can be achieved, or even
about whether any or all purposes of sentencing are relevant to any particular
case or class of cases.
For example, if our objective is imposing a punishment commensurate
with a defendant’s deserts, that can be achieved (if at all) only through an
exercise in moral calculus in which even the relevant factors are debatable and
their appropriate weight even more so. For example, does determination of
what a defendant deserves turn primarily on the seriousness of the crime he
committed? If so, how is that seriousness to be measured? By the magnitude of
the harm caused, and if so, what kinds of harm to whom? Should the state of
the defendant’s mind before, during, or after the time the crime was committed
also count? Should the measure of a defendant’s deserts also include other
factors about the defendant’s personal characteristics, upbringing, social status,
or prior history of good or bad behavior? Critically, how should the menagerie
of factors we finally decide to insert into the calculus of deserts be weighed
against each other and then correlated to a particular quantum of punishment?
Likewise, if our objective is crime control, and we are unwilling to declare
that all criminals should be locked up forever or killed outright, the choice of a
term of imprisonment (or other restriction on liberty) less than life
imprisonment ought to rest on data proving, or at least strongly suggesting, that
the type and length of the sentence imposed correlates positively with lowered
47. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
48. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Phyllis J. Newton & John R. Steer, Competing Sentencing Policies in
a “War on Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 306 (1993) (“The [Sentencing Reform Act]
reflected Congress’ desire for honesty in sentencing by abolishing parole and by substantially reducing
and restructuring good behavior adjustments. This represented a change from an indeterminate to a
determinate, ‘real time’ sentencing system.”).
49. Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 688–89, 692–93.
50. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 15–18 (7th ed. 2015). Some might
add a reprobative or expressive purpose. Id. at 18–19.
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recidivism for persons like the defendant at bar. If our theory is that crime
reduction can be achieved through deterrence, what evidence exists correlating
particular types and lengths of sentences with greater or lesser deterrence? If
we favor the view that crime can be lowered by rehabilitating former offenders,
what do we know about that? The conventional wisdom in the period the
Guidelines were adopted was that “nothing works” to achieve rehabilitation, or
at least that no one could demonstrate particular approaches worked materially
better than others for identifiable classes of defendant. 51 In recent years, some
researchers have become more hopeful about the prospects of rehabilitation at
least for some defendants, 52 but those advances are often tentative and certainly
do not extend to all classes of crime or offender. 53 Even if we seek to achieve
crime control only through the crude mechanism of incapacitation, the decision
about how long to hold a defendant in a prison and away from the general
population ought to be informed by considerations like the propensity of even
prolific offenders to “age out” of crime and the disutility of holding such persons
at public expense after they are statistically unlikely to reoffend. 54
My point is not that the multiplicity of sentencing objectives, each with
its own measure of uncertainty, makes rational sentencing impossible.
Although, let’s face it—the reality is that declaring a particular set of acts with
a particular state of mind and a particular set of resultant harms by a particular
defendant equates to a particular term of years in a cell will always be an exercise
in metaphysics or intuition more than logic. The best any sentencing system
can do is demystify the process and push it in the direction of reasonable
consistency and evidence-based rational choice. Nonetheless, in a system of law,
the decision about whether to consider each of the potentially relevant factors
in any given case and, if so, how to weigh it, ought not be left to the unguided
discretion of individual judges. Without direction, they will inevitably make
different choices at every turn in the sentencing process and thus produce
widely disparate results justified on widely disparate grounds. Judge Marvin
Frankel was right when he said of pre-Guidelines federal sentencing that “the
almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the
fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes
devotion to the rule of law.” 55 A law of sentencing requires some
standardization, some a priori choices that bind, or at least guide, all decision
51. See Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 688–89.
52. Meghan J. Ryan, Science and the New Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 261, 289–90 (2015).
53. For an empirical look at the prevalence of rehabilitative correctional programs from the 1970s
to the mid-2000s, see Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap Between Rhetoric
and Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 33, 35, 44–46 (2011).
54. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE EFFECTS OF AGING ON RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL
OFFENDERS pt. 1 (2017) (“Older offenders [are] substantially less likely than younger offenders to
recidivate following release.”).
55. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL supra note 19, at 5.
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makers about what factors should count, how they should weigh against each
other, and how, at least presumptively and in the absence of countervailing
facts, they should correlate to punishment severity.
That said, the very multifactorial complexity of the sentencing calculus
simultaneously argues against complete delegation to individual judges and
requires some measure of discretion on the part of judges to weigh the
competing considerations that arise in individual cases. The need for some
judicial discretion is made even plainer by the underappreciated reality that
facts which aggravate offense seriousness (and thus presumably sentence
severity) tend to be discrete and often quantifiable, readily provable, and
unidirectional. By unidirectional, I mean that proof of such a fact almost
invariably points toward a higher sentence. For example, selling more drugs,
stealing more money, robbing more victims, or smuggling more immigrants all
increase offense severity. 56
By contrast, a great many of the personal considerations that defendants
traditionally offer in mitigation are more subjective and, crucially, can be
viewed as either aggravating or mitigating depending on the case and the
disposition of the judge. For example, young age might be viewed as a
mitigating factor by one judge on the theory that inexperience and incomplete
emotional development renders a defendant less blameworthy. A different
judge, more focused on crime control and recognizing that criminal activity is
far more common in one’s teens and twenties, might consider youth as a factor
requiring longer incarceration past the statistically crime-prone phase of life.
Conversely, relative old age might be viewed by some judges in some cases as
an aggravating factor because with maturity should come better judgment, while
other judges in other cases might find old age mitigating both because
recidivism is very low among the elderly and because incarcerating the old is
expensive as their medical needs increase with time. Run down the list of
traditional mitigators—education level, mental and emotional conditions,
addictions, employment history, ties to family and community, lack of guidance
as a youth, and so forth—and virtually every one can be a double-edged sword.
If consideration of these factors is to be allowed at all, it almost has to be as an
exercise of case-by-case discretion. 57
56. In theory, I suppose, one could create a system in the basic sentencing level for any class of
offense based on some “average” quantity of drugs, money, victims, or immigrants and then adjust the
guideline range up for more than the average and down for less. Not only would it be very tough to
gather reliable evidence necessary to set such averages, but the basic orientation of the structure would
be the same—every added quantum of whatever measurable quantity you identify makes offense
seriousness worse.
57. This reasoning is the basis for the declarations in Chapter 5H of the original Guidelines that
most such considerations were “not ordinarily relevant” to the judge’s decision of whether to depart
outside the applicable guideline range. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 1987) (“Age is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be
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Finally and crucially, law, or at least law with pretensions of achieving
justice, requires not only rules that help categorize more and less serious crimes
and criminals but some room for mercy, whether wholly earned or bestowed as
an exercise of grace. In short, a sound system of sentencing law requires both
workable rules constraining judicial discretion and a sensible amount of room
for discretion’s exercise.
II. THE GUIDELINES AND THE COMMISSION OVER TIME
When I first encountered the federal sentencing Guidelines as an Assistant
U.S. Attorney in Miami back in 1989, I thought that, in their then-current form,
they did a reasonable job of meeting these fundamental requirements. My last
assignment with the Justice Department was a detail as Special Counsel to the
Sentencing Commission from 1995 to 1996, and I got a look under the hood of
the body which writes the Guidelines. When I left the Department and became
a legal academic in the mid-1990s, I repeatedly defended most features of the
Guidelines system, 58 with the notable exception of the length of many drug
sentences. 59 And between 1995 and 2001, I was deeply involved, first inside the
Commission and then as academic advisor to the Criminal Law Committee of
the U.S. Judicial Conference, in the long process of consolidating and rewriting
the guidelines governing economic crimes that culminated in the so-called
“Economic Crimes Package of 2001.” 60

outside the guidelines.”). Post-Booker amendments have made the Guidelines’ text more hospitable to
outside-the-range sentences on such grounds. See, e.g., id. (stating that age may be relevant in
determining whether a departure is warranted under certain conditions).
58. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Defending Substantial Assistance: An Old Prosecutor’s Meditation
on Singleton, Sealed Case, and the Maxfield-Kramer Report, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 45 (1999);
Bowman, Departing, supra note 35, at 7–9; Bowman, Fear of Law, supra note 25, at 300; Bowman, Quality
of Mercy, supra note 11, at 679–80; Frank O. Bowman, III, To Tell the Truth: The Problem of Prosecutorial
“Manipulation” of Sentencing Facts, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 324, 327 (1996).
59. See, e.g., Bowman, Quality of Mercy, supra note 11, at 740–45; Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael
Heise, Quiet Rebellion? Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV.
1043, 1130–32, 1136 (2001).
60. To review the materials I published during this period, see generally Frank O. Bowman, III,
Back to Basics: Helping the Commission Solve the “Loss” Mess with Old Familiar Tools, 10 FED. SENT’G REP.
115 (1997); Frank O. Bowman, III, Coping with “Loss”: A Re-Examination of Sentencing Federal Economic
Crimes Under the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1998) [hereinafter Bowman, Coping with “Loss”];
Frank O. Bowman, III, A Judicious Solution: The Criminal Law Committee Draft Redefinition of the “Loss”
Concept in Economic Crime Sentencing, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 451, 451–53 (2000) [hereinafter
Bowman, A Judicious Solution]; Frank O. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime Sentencing
Reforms: An Analysis and Legislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5 (2001) [hereinafter Bowman, Analysis and
Legislative History]; Frank O. Bowman, III, Briefing Paper on Problems in Redefining “Loss,” 13 FED.
SENT’G REP. 22 (2001).
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Early Admiration for the Guidelines

Looking back now, my long enthusiasm for the Guidelines stemmed from
a number of factors. The first was that, although it is now easily forgotten, the
Guidelines achieved something quite remarkable. The federal criminal code was
and remains an unholy mess. Indeed, there is no “federal criminal code” as such,
only an ad hoc, disorganized grabbag of hundreds of statutes carrying criminal
penalties sprinkled across at least twenty-six titles of the U.S. Code 61 and
referencing innumerable other passages of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Multiple efforts to rationalize this legal morass have failed. In particular,
Congress has never even sorted the multitude of federal crimes into the kind of
standardized seriousness categories virtually all states employ. 62 Instead, every
federal criminal statute has its own idiosyncratic penalty package. 63 Moreover,
some criminal statutes cover a striking array of types and degrees of criminal
conduct while also prescribing very wide ranges between their minimum and
maximum sentences. 64 And overlaid on all of this is a set of trumps in the form
of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes. 65 As a result, before the
Guidelines, there was no way to meaningfully compare federal offense severity
across crime types or calibrate the relative severity of different criminal
incidents within a crime type.
The original Sentencing Commission and its staff performed something
of a miracle by imposing order on this morass. In what is now Chapter Two of
the Guidelines, the Commission grouped virtually every statutory crime into a
set of crime types; assigned a basic seriousness level to each type; and then
identified and quantified the sentencing value of nonelement factors that, in the
Commission’s view, ought to affect the final seriousness assessment for
particular criminal incidents within each type. 66 Then, in Chapter Three, they
61. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
62. For example, Missouri crimes are sorted into five felony and four misdemeanor classes, each
of which is assigned a penalty range. MO. REV. STAT. § 557.016 (Westlaw through the end of the 2020
2d Reg. Sess. and 1st and 2d Extraordinary Sesss. of the 100th Gen. Assemb.).
63. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 81 (“Whoever [commits arson within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States] shall be imprisoned for not more than 25 years, fined the greater of
the fine under this title or the cost of repairing or replacing any property that is damaged or destroyed,
or both.”); id. § 1111(b) (“Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or
by imprisonment for life.”); id. § 1956(a)(1) (“Whoever [engages in money laundering] shall be
sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the
transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.”).
64. For example, the federal mail fraud statute covers an almost incommensurable array of
conduct and has a statutory sentencing range of zero to thirty years. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
65. See generally U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2011), https://www.ussc.gov/
research/congressional-reports/2011-report-congress-mandatory-minimum-penalties-federal-criminaljustice-system [https://perma.cc/BN26-G63K] (explaining the role of mandatory minimums in the
federal criminal justice system).
66. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
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wrote rules for factors likely to occur across crime types, 67 followed in Chapter
Four by rules about how to treat a defendant’s prior criminal history. 68 Chapter
Five contains rules on how to calculate a final sentence, including how to deal
with multiple counts of conviction and the circumstances under which judges
could depart from the prescribed sentencing range. 69 However much one may
decry the constraints the Guidelines placed on judicial discretion or dislike the
sentencing outcomes they prescribed, they rationalized at least the sentencing
end of federal criminal law into a de facto new criminal code. In that sense at
least, the Guidelines were and remain “in many respects a marvel of the
legislative art.” 70
The second source of my initial admiration for the Guidelines was, surely,
that my introduction to the Guidelines was as a federal prosecutor practicing in
Miami, Florida. As is by now universally recognized, the combination of
Guidelines rigorously enforced by courts of appeals, mandatory minimum
sentences, and government control over the availability of downward departures
for cooperation provided U.S. Attorney’s Offices with immense leverage to
induce guilty pleas and (perhaps more important from my perspective) secure
testimony from co-conspirators in multi-defendant cases. 71 South Florida was
then (and remains) thick with crime and corruption. 72 The Guidelines were a
splendid weapon in battles that needed (and still need) to be fought. Moreover,
South Florida was such a target-rich environment that our office had the luxury
of declining most of the minor and middling cases that make up the bread and
butter of most districts and accepting only cases that would be a really big deal
most anywhere else. In that setting, using the Guidelines’ leverage to turn
cooperators and make significant cases in which defendants received hefty
Guidelines sentences felt not just appropriate, but downright virtuous.
B.

The Economic Crime Package: An Inside Look

In the next phase of my Guidelines life, beginning in 1995 and continuing
for roughly another ten years, I was a U.S. Sentencing Commission insider and
participant in many of its major debates. I saw immediately that the
Commission had some obvious deficiencies, but it seemed then to me an agency
capable of making progressive incremental improvements in the system. The
experience that first buttressed—and then eroded—my faith in the Commission

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. § 3.
Id. § 4.
Id. § 5.
Bowman, Failure of the Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1346.
See Bowman, Departing, supra note 35, at 13–16.
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND 2019 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 35 tbl.1 (2020) [hereinafter SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 REPORT].
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and the Guidelines system was the creation and implementation of the so-called
Economic Crime Package of 2001.
When I served as Special Counsel to the Commission from 1995 to 1996,
the Commission began a reconsideration of the primary guidelines then
governing economic offenses: Section 2B1.1 (theft crimes) and Section 2F.1
(fraud). 73 Over the next six years, the Commission worked with representatives
of the judiciary, the Justice Department, the defense bar, and sentencing
academics and interest groups to address at least four major criticisms of the
existing Guidelines:
(1) There was no sound reason to have separate guidelines for “theft”
and “fraud” crimes.
(2) The most important consideration in the existing theft and fraud
guidelines was the harm inflicted by the crime, as measured by the
amount of “loss” suffered by theft and fraud victims. However, some felt
loss was a bad proxy for offense seriousness, and even those like me who
thought loss should remain central to economic crime sentencing agreed
that the then-current Guidelines’ definition of the term was an archaic
relic of common-law larceny that was unhelpful in most federal economic
crime cases.
(3) There was considerable criticism of the sentencing ranges produced
by former Sections 2B1.1 and 2F1.1—some thought the sentences for
low-level, low-loss offenders were too high, while others thought the
sentences for high-level, high-loss offenders were too low.
(4) The Guidelines at the time produced troublingly high sentence
levels for economic crime defendants who were also convicted of money
laundering. 74
The result of a long, careful, collaborative process was a single consolidated
economic crime guideline, Section 2B1.1, with a revised, causation-based
definition of loss; revised specific offense characteristics; and adjustments of
the loss table that reduced sentences for some low-loss offenders while markedly
increasing them for mid- to high-loss defendants. 75 I was heartened by the
Economic Crime Package because it proved, so I thought, that the Commission
could use data and stakeholder input to reconsider and restructure the
guidelines covering a major crime type. The ability to fundamentally rethink
its own work is key to any healthy administrative agency, and the economic
73. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B1.1; 2F.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1995).
74. For complete accounts of the criticisms of the former separate theft and fraud guidelines and
the long process by which they were consolidated and amended, see generally Bowman, Analysis and
Legislative History, supra note 60, Bowman, Coping with “Loss”, supra note 60, and Bowman, A Judicious
Solution, supra note 60.
75. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2001); see also Bowman,
Analysis and Legislative History, supra note 60, at 29–30.
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crime debate seemed to showcase an agency on a path to institutional health.
Later events soured me on that happy conclusion.
In the first place, the Economic Crime Package proved to be an anomaly,
the only occasion in the over thirty years the Guidelines have been in existence
that the Commission succeeded in materially overhauling the guidelines for any
major crime type. Moreover, although I believe the Economic Crime Package
had a great many strengths, we made some significant mistakes. Two in
particular stand out. First, loss, though far better defined in the new
Section 2B1.1, retained too much influence on the final sentencing range. In
particular, 2001 adjustments to the loss table unreasonably inflated sentencing
ranges in high-loss cases. 76 Second, and even more crucially, we failed to
appreciate the cumulative effect of the new loss table and the multiplicity of
other customizing specific offense characteristics, almost all of them aggravating
factors, written into the new economic crime guideline. Particularly, because
many of these factors—multiple victims, use of sophisticated means, receipt of
more than one million dollars in gross receipts, securities law violations, and
others—correlate with large victim losses, the Guidelines effectively doublecounted the fact of a big fraud. This effect was exacerbated by the logarithmic
structure of the Guidelines sentencing table, in which each move up the offenselevel axis of the table represents a larger incremental increase in sentence length
than the one before. 77 The result was Guidelines’ sentences for large frauds that
were higher than judges would be likely to feel comfortable imposing, and in
some cases absurdly high, with offense levels literally off the top of the
sentencing table chart. 78

76. For an explanation of why this was so and illustrative cases, see generally Frank O. Bowman,
III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 167 (2008).
77. For example, adding one offense level to the total of a first-time offender who previously had
an offense level of nineteen (the original 1987 maximum under Section 2F1.1) increases his minimum
sentence by three months and his maximum by four months. The same one-level increase from an
offense level of thirty increases the defendant’s minimum sentence by eleven months and his maximum
by fourteen. And a one-level increase for an offender with an offense level of forty increases his
minimum by thirty-two months and his maximum by forty months. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2001).
78. FRANK O. BOWMAN, III, COMMENT ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ECONOMIC
CRIME GUIDELINE, § 2B1.1, at 2 (2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendmentprocess/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/Bowman.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7UA-4AQE]; Public
Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, 114th
Cong. 174–77 (2015) (statement of Frank O. Bowman, III), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150312/transcript.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TBL4-3PKJ]. At the same hearing, a representative of the Justice Department conceded that
eliminating the top four levels on the loss chart might be a pretty good idea. Id. at 119–20 (statement
of Benjamin B. Wagner, U.S. Attorney, E.D. California); see also Leah McGrath Goodman, Nonsensical
Sentences for White Collar Criminals, NEWSWEEK (June 26, 2014, 3:18 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/07/04/nonsensical-sentences-white-collar-criminals-256104.html
[https://perma.cc/DJ9T-7GLF].
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This flaw in the 2001 Economic Crime Package amendments should not
have been fatal to the success of the project. A Commission capable of the
original overhaul should have been capable of recognizing the errors and
correcting them in subsequent amendment cycles. Circumstances conspired to
prevent that beneficent result. First, by unhappy coincidence, in December
2001, only a month after the Economic Crime Package went into effect, the
Enron corporation collapsed, 79 followed in 2002 by a series of other high-flying
companies which had diddled their stock valuations. 80 The cascade of corporate
scandals drew the attention of Congress, which rapidly passed the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002. 81 Parts of Sarbanes-Oxley, notably its regulatory aspects,
are excellent. But Congress, egged on by the Bush Administration which
wanted to paint the spate of scandals as the work of a few criminally bad actors
rather than as a regulatory failure, could not resist the urge to include penalty
increases for white-collar crime. 82 Some of these took the form of largely
symbolic increases in statutory maximum sentences for crimes like mail and
wire fraud. 83 But some were directives to the Sentencing Commission strongly
urging increases in guideline sentences for economic offenses. 84
Critically for the present narrative, these directives to the Commission
were included in the legislation even though Congress received extensive
testimony from representatives of law enforcement (including then-U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, James B. Comey, Jr.) and the
legal academy telling them that the Economic Crime Package passed only
months before had already increased white-collar Guidelines’ sentences to more
than adequate levels. 85 Congress was undeterred and, in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, put pressure on the Commission to raise penalties even more. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the Commission responded and in 2003 amended Section 2B1.1
to make it still more punitive. 86 In the years that followed, the Commission has
proven incapable of making material corrections to the flaws in original 2001

79. Ron Rimkus, Enron Corporation, CFA INST. (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.econcrises.org/2016/
12/07/enron-corporation-2001/ [https://perma.cc/T6FX-3FGL].
80. Montange Portfolio, Financial Statement Fraud in Enron, WorldCom Scandals, Fraud Motivation
Triangle and the SOX Act 2002, MEDIUM (Jan. 31, 2017), https://medium.com/@MontangeUpdate/
financial-statement-fraud-in-enron-worldcom-scandals-fraud-motivation-triangle-and-the-sox-actf055a507f89 [https://perma.cc/T8HZ-QANL].
81. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 765 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.).
82. Bowman, Pour Encourager, supra note 38, at 398–401.
83. Id. at 400–01.
84. Id. at 405–11.
85. Penalties for White Collar Crime Offenses: Are We Really Getting Tough on Crime?: Hearing on
Penalties for White Collar Crime Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, 107th
Cong. 18–20, 23–26 (statements of Joseph R. Biden, Jr., James B. Comey, Jr., and Bradley W. Skolnik)
(2002).
86. Bowman, Pour Encourager, supra note 38, at 431–35.
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Economic Crime Package or of rolling back the later congressionally induced
enhancements of white-collar sentencing levels. They have discussed the
question endlessly, and nibbled at the edges, but no more. 87
The same pattern has long been evident for other crime types. The
sentences for drug cases prescribed by the very first iteration of the Guidelines
started out too high, largely due to the Commission’s choice to build drug
sentencing levels around congressionally mandated quantity-based mandatory
minimums. 88 Very high drug sentences created an immediate sore point, and as
the years passed, the Guidelines became increasingly punitive for virtually all
classes of cases. Because of the design and institutional siting of the Sentencing
Commission, that body proved persistently incapable of responding creatively
to any of its constituencies except the Justice Department and Congress. The
result was a system in which the Guidelines were amended routinely and
copiously but almost always in the direction of making them more punitive for
defendants. 89 The Commission, with rare exceptions, proved incapable of
materially lowering Guidelines’ sentencing levels even for classes of cases that
were broadly agreed to be overpunished, notably drugs 90 and child
pornography. 91

87. See generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Damp Squib: The Disappointing Denouement of the Sentencing
Commission’s Economic Crime Project (and What They Should Do Now), 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 270 (2015)
(discussing the critiques of the consolidated fraud and theft guideline).
88. Bowman & Heise, supra note 59, at 1059–62.
89. The Commission has to some extent recognized this problem, describing it as “factor creep.”
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW
WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING
REFORM 137 (2004), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchprojects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNB8P5KJ] (quoting Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines–Psychological
and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 739–75 (2001)).
90. For discussion of high drug sentences and the response by the Sentencing Commission,
prosecutors, and courts, see Bowman & Heise, supra note 59. The Commission has acted from time to
time to reduce drug sentences. Id. at 1074–80 (describing increased acceptance of responsibility
adjustment, the 1994 elimination of the top two levels of the drug quantity table, adjustments to
marijuana guidelines in 1995, and change in the “mixture or substance” definition). Many of the
Sentencing Commission’s more recent actions in the area have related to cocaine sentencing,
particularly the sentences of crack cocaine offenders. See, e.g., US: Crack Cocaine Ruling a Victory for
Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 1, 2011, 11:47 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/01/us-crackcocaine-ruling-victory-rights [https://perma.cc/3LVL-K6HE] (discussing a decision to allow
retroactive application of new crack cocaine sentencing guidelines).
91. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 1
(2009), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-andsurveys/sex-offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LCF
-LBQT] (providing the history of the child pornography guidelines); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, QUICK
FACTS: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENDERS 1 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/quick-facts/Child_Pornography_FY19.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6T6-8LVE]
(“The average sentence of child pornography offenders was 101 months; 99% were sentenced to
prison.”).
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Even these defects need not have been fatal to the guideline system had
the judiciary been provided more leeway to sentence outside the ranges
prescribed by the Guidelines’ rules. But throughout the pre-Booker era, the
Commission remained quite resistant to what it sometimes saw as judicial
disregard of the Commission’s mandates. More importantly, both the Justice
Department and Congress (particularly when controlled by Republicans) were
consistently and aggressively hostile to any effort by the judiciary to escape the
strictures of the Guidelines.
In 1996, the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States 92 tried to loosen the
reins a bit and confer increased judicial departure discretion. 93 Prosecutors in
the Clinton Justice Department grumbled a bit, but when President George W.
Bush won the presidency in 2000, his Justice Department began taking active
measures both to train prosecutors to press for within-Guidelines sentences and
to constrain district judge discretion. 94 Likewise, in 2003, Congress—then
controlled by Republicans 95 who were in a particularly punitive mood—passed
the Feeney Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End
the Exploitation of Children Today (“PROTECT”) Act of 2003, 96 which
effectively reversed the Koon decision, eliminated a number of grounds for
departure, and imposed a de novo standard of review on appeals of downward
departures. 97
I took a number of sobering lessons from all this. The most important was
that the ideal of sentence levels set and continually adjusted by a neutral body
of experts that inspired the creation of the Sentencing Commission has proven
ineffective, at least in the federal setting. Congress, which largely deferred to
the Sentencing Commission for some years following its creation, long since
stopped doing so. Rather, it quickly resumed the habit, natural to legislatures,
of upping penalties for whatever crime type is grabbing public attention. And
the Guidelines structure, with its forty-three offense levels and hundreds of
sentencing factors, turns out to provide an ideal vehicle for congressional
92. 518 U.S. 81 (1996). See generally Bowman, Heartland, supra note 35, at 19.
93. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 91–100 (holding that an appellate court should not review de novo a
decision to depart from the Guidelines sentencing range but instead should ask whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion).
94. Edward Lazarus, Ashcroft’s New Charging, Plea Bargaining, and Sentencing Policies: Consideration
Necessary, but Criticism Overstated, CNN (Oct. 3, 2003, 1:02 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/
10/03/findlaw.analysis.lazarus.ashcroft/ [https://perma.cc/G8QF-RTML].
95. Congress Profiles, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES,
https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/108th/ [https://perma.cc/V3HU-EKPN].
96. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)).
97. Id. § 401(d)(1), 117 Stat. at 670. For an overview of the Feeney Amendment and the
controversy it provoked, see Douglas A. Berman, Locating the Feeney Amendment in a Broader Sentencing
Reform Landscape, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 249, 249 (2004); see also M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for
Juries, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 533, 565–66 (2005) (discussing the Feeney Amendment).
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micromanagement. Crucially, the Commission itself has proven to have limited
ability to resist congressional pressure. The Commission has had its own
internal pathologies, but the primary obstacle to its maturation into a
meaningfully independent body has been Congress, both in what it has done
and in what the Commission constantly fears it might do. The result was a
Guidelines system that became in practical effect a one-way upward ratchet. In
2005, I accepted this inescapable reality and concluded that structural flaws in
the design of the Guidelines consigned them to inevitable failure. 98
C.

Reflections on Booker

And then came Booker, which was, of course, the culmination of a line of
thinking opened by the Supreme Court’s decision five years before in
Apprendi. 99 Apprendi was, on its facts, no more than an application of the longstanding rule that judges may not impose sentences higher than the statutory
maximum sentence prescribed by the legislature. 100 The peculiarity of the
statute at issue in the case was that it purported to allow a sentence higher than
the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum based on a purely judicial finding
of fact (that the defendant had acted from racial animus). 101 That oddity invited
the Court to wrestle further with the long-standing question of how to define
an “element” of a crime which, under In re Winship, 102 the prosecution must
prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 103 Justice Stevens’ majority opinion
in Apprendi intimated—without actually so holding—that facts designated by
structured sentencing regimes to direct judicial sentencing choices inside
traditional statutory maximum and minimum sentencing ranges might be
deemed “elements” subject to the jury trial right of the Sixth Amendment. 104
I think it key to remember that Apprendi was decided in 2000. In my view,
had the Sentencing Commission, Congress, and the Justice Department
(particularly under President Bush) been more cautious and more respectful of
judicial sensibilities, the latent potential of Justice Stevens’ Apprendi opinion to
upend the federal Guidelines, and indeed structured sentencing in all state
systems, might never have been realized. In combination, the cumulative
actions of these institutions were a direct challenge—even an insult—to the
values and spirit of the federal bench. And all of them failed to recognize that

98. Bowman, Failure of the Guidelines, supra note 4, at 1319–20.
99. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
100. See id. at 491–92.
101. Id. at 468–69.
102. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
103. Id. at 368.
104. See Bowman, Debacle, supra note 4, at 399–403 (discussing Justice Stevens’ opinion in
Apprendi).
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judges, too, can be pushed only so far and that immense self-protective power
can be summoned from the general language of the Federal Constitution.
As discontent with the Guidelines percolated among federal judges, so too
did the possibilities of Apprendi’s logic. In 2004, in Blakely v. Washington, 105 the
Supreme Court invalidated a Washington state guidelines system that barred
judges from imposing a sentence in excess of the presumptive guideline range
but beneath the statutory maximum, without first finding facts in addition to
the fact of conviction. 106 Such additional facts, said the Court, were “elements”
because they permitted a higher sentence than would be possible in their
absence and thus required a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 107 The path
from Blakely to the invalidation of the federal guidelines in Booker was plain.
The Court took it. 108 In my view, the Court’s choice to move from the
unexceptional decision in Apprendi to defend the traditional understanding of a
statutory maximum sentence to the radical adventure of invalidating the entire
structured sentencing movement—both state and federal—cannot be
understood without appreciating the psychological overhang of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. In Blakely and Booker, the Court crafted a constitutional
rationalization for lifting what a good many judges felt to be the yoke of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines from their necks. But in doing so, it did far more
than defenestrate a structure federal judges found particularly galling to
themselves. Together, Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker effectively ban law and reify
judicial discretion in sentencing.
This is not the place to rehash my many criticisms of the Supreme Court’s
tortured, constitutionally threadbare rationale for first finding the Guidelines
unconstitutional as violative of the Sixth Amendment jury trial requirement
and then, in the same opinion, resurrecting them as advisory by judicially
amending the Sentencing Reform Act. 109 I hope the day will come when the
Court will revisit the mess they made and substitute, as they might have from
the outset, a constitutional theory that allows for a sensible balance of law and
judicial discretion in criminal sentencing. For that project, a judicious
combination of Sixth Amendment and due process principles would be a far
more sensible vehicle than the Apprendi-Booker line’s torture of the Sixth
Amendment. 110 But for now and the immediately foreseeable future, the
constitutional questions are water over the dam. Booker reigns. Any
105. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
106. Id. at 305.
107. Id. at 306–08.
108. Over, I may say, my frantic and wholly impotent objections. See Frank O. Bowman, III, Train
Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing System Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington,
41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 217, 219–20 (2004) (addressing the federal implications of Blakely).
109. For an extended critique of United States v. Booker and the cases preceding and following it,
see generally Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle, supra note 4.
110. Id. at 473–75.
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modifications of federal (or state) sentencing law must accommodate the central
holding of Booker and its progeny that no fact found by a judge rather than a
jury can create a binding, or indeed even presumptive, limitation on the upper
or lower bounds of a criminal sentence. 111
Which brings me to the final and most notable failure of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. In 1987, it brought forth a system expressly designed
to set narrow and strongly presumptive limits on judicial sentencing choice.
Every aspect of the system as originally created and progressively amplified
over the next seventeen pre-Booker years was premised on that objective. Yet in
the fifteen years since the Supreme Court decreed that this—the Guidelines’
raison d’etre—was constitutionally impermissible, the Commission has refused
do the obviously necessary thing: recraft the federal sentencing system to
accommodate the Booker holding either by designing a guidelines structure in
which sentencing factors are triable to a jury or by rethinking the Guidelines as
a purely advisory system. Instead, the Commission has remained paralyzed. It
has proposed no new system, and only a few tiny modifications of the existing
one that grudgingly acknowledge its advisory status. 112 The result is that
lawyers, probation officers, and courts are obliged to go through the whole
highly detailed ritual of finding Guidelines facts and applying Guidelines rules
to generate a Guidelines sentencing range that, by law, the sentencing judge is
prohibited from formally giving any more weight than any other sentencing
consideration. 113 Appellate courts can, in theory, reverse sentences as
substantively unreasonable, 114 but they scarcely ever do. Most of the small
percentage of appellate reversals on sentencing grounds are for errors in
applying the Guidelines rules, not appellate disagreement with the substance of
the outcome. For example, in fiscal year 2019, of 6,793 cases resolved on appeal,
only 357 were reversed or remanded on grounds related to sentencing; of those,
308 were reversed for improper calculation of the guideline range and only six
were reversed for unreasonableness. 115
Moreover, I can attest from my annual review of appellate decisions
required to revise a sentencing treatise that the quality of appellate work in the
area falls steadily with each passing year. The courts of appeals palpably expend
ever-declining amounts of intellectual energy on careful analysis of sentencing
issues. It is plain that appellate judges have internalized the view that the
111. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
112. E.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1, cmt. background (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2018) (belatedly recognizing that a sentence outside the Guidelines range that was not justifiable as a
departure would be characterized as a “variance”).
113. Weirdly, under Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), an appellate court can, but need
not, afford a properly calculated guideline range a presumption of correctness, but a district cannot do
so, and can be reversed if it is so impolitic as to say that this was the case. Rita, 551 U.S. at 351–56.
114. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
115. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 REPORT, supra note 72, at 177 tbl.A-1, 188 tbl.A-6.
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Guidelines are entirely advisory and that district court sentencing choices are,
in the last analysis, almost completely discretionary. The result is a body of
appellate law that is less and less useful to litigants and courts and signals,
through its very superficiality, that district judges are free to do pretty much
what they like. As I wrote six years ago in language even more apt today,
In practical fact, district court judges are now at liberty to adhere to or
ignore guideline ranges as the spirit moves them, subject only to the
requirement that a sentence outside the range be accompanied by some
explanation which (a) is couched in the gloriously inclusive terminology
or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and (b) is not on its face barking mad. 116
That being said, if the federal judiciary had totally cast the Guidelines
aside, paying them no attention at all when setting sentences, the requirement
of applying the Guidelines to every case would merely be a deplorable waste of
time and resources. But in the fifteen years since Booker, the Guidelines have
proven astoundingly resilient, even if somewhat less determinative of sentences
in individual cases. Since Booker, the percentage of defendants sentenced within
the sentencing range calculated by the court has slowly but steadily declined,
from 72% in 2004, 117 the year before Booker, to 51.4% in 2019; 118 and the
aggregate average (mean) length of federal sentences across all offense types has
drifted downwards as well, from 56.8 months in 2003 119 to 46 months in 2019. 120
But within most offense types, sentence lengths have held remarkably stable,
particularly for economic crimes, most firearms offenses, and every drug type
except crack cocaine. 121 Much of the decline in the national average (mean)
sentence has been driven by changes in the case mix among all federal offenders
116. Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 5, at 1232–34.
117. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
tbl.26 (2004), https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive/sourcebook-2004 [https://perma.cc/
Z5AM-Q568]. The Commission compiled separate data for the periods before and after the Blakely
decision. Id. For the pre-Blakely period, the percentage of cases sentenced within-range was 72.2%. For
the post-Blakely period, the percentage was 71.8%. Id.
118. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 REPORT, supra note 72, at 88 tbl.29.
119. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AVERAGE LENGTH OF IMPRISONMENT FOR OFFENDERS IN EACH
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY BY PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY: FISCAL YEAR 2003, https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/
2003/table14_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4EF-2TZW].
120. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 REPORT, supra note 72, at 82 tbl.28.
121. See id. at 126 fig.D-5 (illustrating the sentence length of drug-trafficking offenders by major
drug over time and showing little change in average sentence lengths between 2010 and 2019 for any
drug type except crack cocaine); id. at 137 fig.I-3 (illustrating sentence length of immigration offenders
over time and showing very modest changes in average sentence length for immigration offenders
except in simple illegal-reentry cases where average sentence declined by about eleven months between
2010 and 2019); id. at 162 fig.E-4 (illustrating sentence length of economic offense offenders over time
and showing average fraud sentences increased and sentence lengths for other economic crime offenses
held largely static between 2010 and 2019); id. at 150 fig.F-5 (illustrating sentence length of firearms
offenders over time).
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and, in particular the increased percentage of relatively low-sentence
immigration cases. 122
It turns out that even when judges sentence outside the applicable
guideline range, their sentences tend to cluster near that range. 123 In one way
this is hardly surprising. Even if the Guidelines are no longer law, they look
and feel like law. They are written as rules and their application requires
findings of fact. They bear the imprimatur of both Congress and a supposedly
expert agency. They provide benchmarks, however nominally advisory, for the
inherently metaphysical exercise of matching crime to punishment. And they
are what the judges are used to, both in process and result.
All of which might be fine if we agreed that the penalty ranges
recommended by the Guidelines—the ranges judges continue to use as the
baseline for their sentencing decisions—were substantively desirable. But in
that respect, virtually nothing of real consequence has changed since Booker. If
one thought that the Guidelines were categorically too punitive in 2005 when
Booker was decided, one’s opinion on that point will certainly be the same today.
Granted, there have been a few ameliorating tweaks over the past few years, but
the changes are limited and marginal. Likewise, nothing about the Guidelinesamendment process has materially changed. The Commission is structurally
identical. Its subordinate relation to the Justice Department and Congress
remains unchanged. In important classes of cases, statutory mandatory
minimum sentences continue to cabin the Commission’s options, even if it
wanted to be more adventurous.
In short, the federal sentencing regime we have—birthed from the
interplay of congressional desires, Sentencing Commission shortfalls, and the
constitutional constraints imposed by a Supreme Court determined to reaffirm
judicial sentencing authority—is a painfully unsatisfactory relic.
III. LOOKING AHEAD
What, then, can we reasonably expect of the federal sentencing system in
the near future? I would very much like to see a complete rethinking of the
existing structure. Such a reexamination should go back to basics and consider
the lessons that the current Guidelines’ genesis, structure, and history teach
about a series of basic questions:
(1) Ought sentencing to involve law in the ordinary sense at all, or
ought it be entrusted entirely to the personal discretionary judgment of
individual judges?

122. Bowman, Dead Law Walking, supra note 5, at 1237–41.
123. Id. at 1244–50.
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(2) If there is to be a law of sentencing, how fact-driven ought it to be
and how restrictive of judicial discretion?
(3) If there is to be a law of sentencing, who should assume the primary
responsibility and authority to make the rules: judges themselves, either
through rulemaking (like that which generated the Federal Rules of
Evidence) or through a case-by-case common-law process; an
independent expert agency; the legislature; or some combination of
judges, experts, and legislature?
(4) If a reimagined structured system is to replace the current
Guidelines, how can one accommodate what I see as the need for law in
sentencing with the peculiar constraints created by Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker?
(5) Should we reinstitute back-end discretionary release authority, in
effect resurrecting some version of parole?
(6) Finally, and most importantly, what objectives are we trying to
achieve in federal criminal sentencing and how can we reconceive the
sentencing process and, where appropriate, recalibrate the prison
sentences that will inevitably be the lot of most federal defendants to
better achieve those objectives?
My view is that we need a contemporary reboot of the process that
produced the Sentencing Reform Act itself. But for that to occur and produce
genuinely transformative results, two improbable things would have to happen.
First, the Supreme Court would need to reconsider the Apprendi-Booker line of
cases and address intelligently the real source of its concern—the appropriate
level of constraint a legislature may place on judicial sentencing discretion in
the intervals between true statutory minimum and maximum sentences. If that
were done, and done properly, there would be constitutional space to create
sensible new sentencing schemes for both federal and state courts. Sadly, I have
no expectation that the Court will do this. They abandoned serious
consideration of their Apprendi-Booker project years ago and have confined their
attention to tidying it up around the edges. 124 Probably for two reasons. To
begin, the pure pragmatists probably believed that the objective of defanging
the federal Guidelines and returning functional control over individual
sentencing choices to federal trial judges had been largely accomplished.
Further, the wiser heads have, I suspect, realized that the Blakely-Booker
extension of Apprendi is a logical mess and that untangling it and putting
something more sensible in its place would involve a long, tedious project of
124. See generally Bowman, Debacle, supra note 4, at 447–59 (discussing several Sixth Amendment
sentencing cases where the Court bound itself more firmly to the Booker logic); see also United States
v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2019) (applying the Blakely-Booker line of cases to supervised
release revocation); Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013) (holding facts generating
mandatory minimum sentences require jury finding).
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reimagining the whole area of law. They have, to date, signaled no stomach for
such a venture.
Second, fundamental reform of federal sentencing, whether constrained
by or freed from the Apprendi-Booker straitjacket, would require executive
initiative and congressional action. If of an optimistic turn of mind, one could
hope that the recent change in administration and in control of Congress might
open a window during which this kind of comprehensive reevaluation would be
welcomed, or at least not rejected out of hand, by those who control the critical
levers of federal power. Were that to occur, and were a new administration and
new Congress to give appropriate direction to the Sentencing Commission or
some other independent body, it is just possible that, after another long and
painful interval, a revivified federal sentencing could be born. But to be
painfully honest, my best bet is that our current national circumstances of
partisan polarization and government dysfunction will prevent a meaningful
federal initiative anytime soon. Therefore, I sorrowfully expect to continue coauthoring my sentencing guidelines treatise for many years to come. And
should I live so long, to recycle these remarks at a symposium on the 30th and
40th anniversaries of Apprendi.
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